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Abstract 
 
 This paper aims to shed light on the trends of right-wing populism in tandem with 
immigration rates, economic indicators, and social welfare and active labor market 
initiatives in Germany after World War II. The current right-wing populist party in 
Germany, the Alternative for Deutschland, has had a sharp increase in support in recent 
years and currently sits as the third largest party in Germany. Looking at trends from past 
right-wing populist parties, I identify the important characteristics of the current climate 
that allow right-wing populist parties to flourish. 
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Introduction 
 The twentieth century brought a clash of superpowers through constant 
disagreements in policy and power dynamics. Across the world as each country vied for a 
spot at the top through war and alliances. World War II provided a particularly 
detrimental time for Germany since it started the war with few countries above it and, 
ended with strict new legislation from the international community that strived to keep 
Germany from ever gaining the same level of power again. This legislation intentionally 
created the division of Germany into four segments that were each controlled by a 
different superpower. Eventually, France, Britain, and the United States combined their 
sectors, creating West Germany, and leaving East Germany by itself under Soviet Union 
control. This division would plague the country’s history for decades.1 From pure Nazism 
to the internment camps, Germany quickly became an enemy to countless countries 
across the world. For many Germans, the punishment for the terrible actions of the death 
camps was understandable. Stories are still being told today about survivors of those 
atrocities, and those in power have taken specific precautions to prevent a repeat of 
history. 
 While World War II was not necessarily a clear battle between the West and the 
East, it definitely created the beginnings of the rocky narrative that would play out in the 
Cold War almost immediately after World War II. Unfortunately for Germany, the Cold 
War split the country into opposing states and set the stage for the long conflict and 
recovery from this period that the German people would have to endure. Unlike ethnic 
 
1 “The Cold War Museum,” Cold War Museum, accessed December 4, 2019. 
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conflicts that continue to plague the world today, this struggle came about as an 
ideological war between the West and the East, and Germany was caught in the middle. 
While other countries may have had small factions that disagreed with their government’s 
decisions within the Cold War, Germany had a literal wall built between the two states, 
isolating ideas and preventing healthy debate and conversation. Those who were stuck in 
the East and felt they belonged in the West attempted to cross the wall and were promptly 
gunned down by militants in towers. The harshness of these drastic measures has left a 
deep scar in the German culture still visible today. 
 Focusing on the implications of this enforced divide, the polarizing actions of the 
wall drove strong wedges between the German people and allowed for continued implicit 
division even after the wall was destroyed. While the West embraced globalization and 
integration into open market policy, the East continued to pull itself closer to the Soviet 
Bloc and the traditional ways that emphasized nationalism and ethnocentrism. Differing 
from the internment camps throughout World War II, the wall targeted Germans. 
Germany may have been an instigator in the beginning of World War II and East 
Germany a large participant in the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War, but as I will 
explain later, the country left these wars defeated and in dire need of substantial 
rebuilding.  
 Throughout this paper, I will explain how right-wing populism came to be within 
Germany and the factors that provide it the platform to excel in the political playing field. 
I assert that the three main sectors that influence the rise and fall of right-wing populism 
are: immigration and globalization, economic trends such as unemployment rates, and 
social welfare and active labor market initiatives. While some of these terms may seem 
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foreign, I will define each and explain how it has shaped the rhetoric around right-wing 
populism in Germany, specifically after World War II until present day.  
 This paper was inspired by the quick rise in support for the current right-wing 
populist party, the Alternative for Deutschland (AfD). The AfD is by no means the first 
right-wing populist party to ever exist in Germany, but it is the first to gain the number of 
seats in the Bundestag that it holds today since WWII, specifically after the Nazi’s lost 
power. It might seem simple to only look at the history of the AfD itself and what may 
have caused its rise, but I will look deeper into the historical trends of right-wing 
populism as a movement in Germany and from there, extrapolate to understand the 
importance of the record breaking performance of the AfD. My aim is to spark some 
concern in the possibility of a permanent switch to more nationalistic, xenophobic 
sentiments in Germany by assessing how the AfD has learned from former right-wing 
populist groups that has led to greater prosperity for the party than ever before. The rest 
of the world is right to be at least slightly alarmed by this idea, which is why it is 
important for us to look at likely trends instead of the AfD alone. As I explain throughout 
the paper, this phenomenon is not a fluke and should not be taken lightly.  
 While many countries across Europe have been experiencing rises in right-wing 
populism in recent years, Germany is an interesting case because right-wing populism, at 
its worst, has had a large impact on the country, its ethnic minorities, and the 
government’s actions to mitigate the public dissidence. We can observe significant 
variation in its overall impact on the government, especially in times of crisis. 
Additionally, in 2018 I had the unique opportunity to study abroad in Germany and 
experience first-hand the effects of the sudden rise in populism in 2017 at the local level. 
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This paper begins by explaining what right-wing populism is before continuing into a 
separate chapter about each of the three sectors that are key indicators for right-wing 
populism, as I identified above. Finally, I will consolidate the argument into a 
concentrated lens assessing the AfD specifically and thus explain possibilities to look out 
for in the coming years in German politics using the assessment of previous trends of 
right-wing populism. 
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Chapter 1 – What is Right-wing Populism? 
Right-wing Populism is a confusing term that provides little context into the 
movement and ideology behind it. While it has become more prevalent over the last few 
decades, it has been around for centuries. The term is best explained by separating it into 
two parts: right-wing and populism, before assessing the term as a whole. Most people 
are able to understand the fundamentals of right-wing groups from just hearing the term. 
Populism is much more alluding. As a movement, it allows the working class to seek 
protection for their culture and way of life through means of curbing globalization and 
providing security. Looking at both sides of the term will provide a concrete definition to 
an otherwise confusing political agenda. 
Several economists have worked to define the term populism in simple terms. The 
most common factor they find is that populism does not fit into any clear boxes and 
instead is more ideological than many other political groups. Populism is most clearly 
defined by Ernesto Laclau, author of Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: 
Capitalism, Fascism, and Populism, as a political movement. The largest discrepancy 
between populist movements and established political parties, is that populism targets the 
working and lower classes that feel underrepresented. The movement itself is centered on 
gaining more representation but usually does not consist of a uniform power structure 
that will adequately provide these ends. Laclau describes it as “upholding an anti-status 
quo ideology” since their demands are often abstract instead of tangible.2 Populism is 
often the political term used when a party does not have a uniform constituent base or a 
 
2 Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism(London: 
NLB, 1979), 151. 
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consistent set of demands between one movement to the next. Unlike other political 
parties that perpetuate due to their uniform organization and consistent constituent base, 
populist parties are often considered more rash since they are created from grassroots 
movements. They seek to shake the system and be the catalyst for change regardless of 
which side of the spectrum the party falls on, right or left.3 
The other side of the definition is the right-wing aspect of these movements. This 
half provides more clarification for their demands of and qualms with the current 
establishment’s goals and policies. Right-wing groups are often considered extremist and 
nationalist. They have been known to use violence and protests to catalyze the 
insecurities within the population. Many of the extremist groups have been Neo-Nazi and 
anti-Semitist. This extremist right-wing side preaches communal dependence and 
preservation, little care for marginalized groups, and a strong emphasis on xenophobia.4 
Essentially, they are looking to protect the German culture and ethnicity from alteration 
due to integration of other groups of people. Unfortunately, instead of working to bolster 
the German culture, they have decided to create a platform around putting other groups 
down and prevent them from advancing within society, in an effort to preserve German 
culture. 
The right-wing aspect works well with the populist part because both cater to the 
insecurities of the lower socio-economic classes who have the most to lose from 
globalization yet are also looking for the most change. The majority of people in this 
category worry about the decline of economic institutions and therefore will do anything 
 
3 Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2018), p.4. 
4 Hans-Georg Betz, Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe(New York: St. Martins 
Press, 1994), p.4. 
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they can to prevent others from taking their small amount of security from them.5 
Through the various mediums of propaganda from the leaders of these movements, fear 
and doubt are exploited and amplified until support is high enough for the party to gain 
seats within the government and provide the common citizen the opportunity to actually 
change laws. These parties operate under the guise that the average person knows best 
and therefore should be catered to by the government. They believe that without these 
lower-class people in the parliament, the government cannot ever be expected to provide 
correctly for them.6  
Diving into the specifics of right-wing populism, Hans-Georg Betz has shown to 
be a leading analyst in the field specifically in the 1990s. Due to the nature of the right-
wing populist groups emerging throughout Europe, and specifically in Germany at the 
time, the established government structure of Western democracy was formidably 
challenged by these parties. Instead of resorting to violence and radical, reactionary 
political actions, they began targeting governmental actions and finding non-traditional 
extremist ways to gain support.7 Since that time period, other analysts cite that while they 
have not resorted back to the extreme measures in full, they have not completely 
abandoned them either.8 Understanding that they are the type of group that needs to 
create a scene in order to be noticed and taken seriously, they have little choice but to be 
the loudest voice in any room. For example, many of their protests involve large 
 
5 Hans-Georg Betz and Duane Swank, “Globalization, the Welfare State and Right-Wing 
Populism in Western Europe,” Socio-Economic Review1, no. 2 (January 2003): pp. 215-245, 
p.219. 
6 Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, 4. 
7 Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, 3. 
8 Christina Schori Liang, “‘Nationalism Ensures Peace’: the Foreign and Security Policy of the 
German Populist Radical Right After (Re)Unification,” in Europe for the Europeans The Foreign 
and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right(London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 139-175, p.144. 
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demonstrations where police officers need to separate right-wing populist supporters 
from opposition to prevent violence. Their fight for power as the underdog allows them 
to get away with trying new tactics to gain support, but also means that there is never 
comfort in their status because their platform hinges on several dependent variables. 
Hans-George Betz assesses how to mitigate the risks of creating a right-wing 
populist group based on the types of people who are affiliated with it. He asserts that 
“systems characterized by comprehensive coverage of citizens within risk categories, a 
generous social wage and well developed active labour market programmes” are the key 
to keeping the working class satisfied and able to provide for themselves on a 
fundamental level.9 Making the constituent group that most supports these extremes 
satisfied with their opportunity within society is the most straightforward approach to 
curbing right-wing support. By securing the resources for citizens to take care of their 
families, the government can relax a little. People are tend to be fairly individualistic on a 
fundamental level and often just want the opportunity to earn a wage and create an 
enjoyable life for themselves and their families. 
Taking this analysis a step further, other analysts such as Christina Schori Liang 
find examples of this clear need for security. She asserts that the “German populist 
radical right call for ethnic apartheid in Germany plays well with established popular 
perceptions that foreigners are an economic threat, depleting the social welfare system 
and exploiting the German taxpayer.”10 This analysis targets both the economic 
opportunities and social welfare the supporters believe they are entitled to. As more 
 
9 Betz and Swank, 224. 
10 Liang, 147. 
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people without jobs or other economic means flood into the country, it is understandable 
for those already teetering on the poverty line to become protective. Unfortunately, this 
protectiveness quickly turns into xenophobia. Their fear of losing their security becomes 
anger toward the people who have the potential to take it away, the government and the 
immigrants. 
These threats to social welfare and economic security have increased since the 
end of WWII as globalization grew. After the internet and seamless communication were 
established, this rate increased exponentially. It is now easier to create widespread 
constituency groups since reaching and catering to them can involve social media and 
mass communication. The government can only limit portions of their digital platform so 
other means must be targeted if they want to minimize this threat. 
Former right-wing populist groups have been prevalent in Germany for centuries 
even if there has been a rise since WWII. With the increase in globalization, economic 
fluctuation, social welfare institutions, and fear of losing everything, groups like this are 
not only important to create a balance between elites and the working class, but also to 
give everyone a voice. Democracy promises an equal voice for all citizens. One of the 
biggest qualms the party has with the current system is the high influx of refugees and 
immigrants who are receiving special privileges while those who are loyal citizens are 
barely making ends meet. After the election for the Bundestag in 2017, polls showed that 
“they perceive a climate of growing lawlessness and criminality in Germany. They feel 
disadvantages vis-a-vis refugees. 68 percent think that Germany is going in the wrong 
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direction and feel personally ignored and disadvantaged.”11 As shown throughout history, 
the most successful groups are often those who have a personal connection to the cause. 
The more the middle and lower classes feel ignored, the more they will raise their voices. 
Today, there is a right-wing populist party called Alternative for Germany (AfD) 
which is making large strides for their supporters. Learning from the tactics of former 
right-wing populist groups such as the Republikaner, which gained quick support in the 
1980s, they are targeting the fears of those who are willing to mobilize and be 
unapologetically loud. In the 2017 election, the most important phenomenon was the 
staggering performance in support of the AfD. The party gained 12.6 percent of the vote 
which landed it as the third largest party in the country. This obviously sets those 
representatives up to create substantial change as the largest opponent to Angela Merkel’s 
coalition between the two largest parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Christian 
Democratic Union.12 The advantage of having a platform that is not set in stone is that it 
allows the party better adaptability based on the political, social, and economic climate. 
In the current climate, the economy is fairly stable but the social welfare institutions and 
the perceived security of the border are more variable.  
Even with this variability, the principal fear of wanting to preserve the German 
culture prevails. While in previous years the group that was threatening this delicate 
ideology may have been different, the group continues to assert that they “want stronger 
border security and that the influence of Islam is too great in Germany and that German 
 
11 Eric Langenbacher and Jonathan Olsen, “The Left Party and the AfD: Populist Competitors in 
Eastern Germany,” in Twilight of the Merkel Era: Power and Politics in Germany After the 2017 
Bundestag Election(Berghahn Books, 2019), pp. 126-139, p.129-30. 
12  Langenbacher and Olsen, 126. 
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culture and language is being lost.”13 The quick turn to xenophobia is the most alarming 
aspect of the platform, especially in a time filled with international turmoil in developing 
countries and thousands of refugees seeking asylum. Germany has been a large provider 
of aid during these times of international crisis, but this could change in the very near 
future. 
Populism is a malleable term that provides little context into the platform and 
policy it supports, and instead can be categorized better as a movement. It consistently 
targets the working class and those who are looking for a change in the current 
establishment as the country becomes a larger global entity and the government focuses 
outward. Right-wing groups are nationalist and protectionist and while there are varying 
levels of extremism within the spectrum, their demands do not change much. Right-wing 
populism thus provides the working class the means to act on their fears of globalization 
and security by protecting their culture and way of life using whatever means possible. 
The rapid growth of these groups has sounded alarms in the past and will continue to do 
so as they gain momentum.  
 
 
  
 
13 Langenbacher and Olsen, 130. 
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Chapter 2 – Immigration and Globalization 
Since the end of World War II, immigration in Germany has been a hot topic 
because of the trend toward globalization worldwide. World War II created a hostile 
relationship between Germany and many countries throughout the western world as it 
began the path of paying reparations for the damage done with two different states and 
two different foreign policy goals. West Germany was more open to the policy goals 
imposed by the western superpowers and the East German government fervently opposed 
them, but much of its population did not. By the 1980s, many German nationalists 
throughout East Germany became fed up with the western superpowers constantly 
putting Germany down. Additionally, the East German government in particular 
perceived the constant immigration through globalization as a direct threat to the 
preservation of their way of life. Globalization is defined as the process in which a 
country begins to take advantage of economic markets internationally. For Germany, and 
many other European states, this means lowering barriers to entry through allowing 
workers and goods to cross borders more easily. This agreement to lean into the 
European Union was not well received by right-wing populist groups and created an 
incubator for them to flourish among the masses. As the German government pushed for 
European integration and further globalization, right-wing populism listened to those who 
were uneasy about this large change. 
The Republikaner was the first strong right-wing populist group that arose in the 
1980s and persisted until shortly after the reunification of East and West Germany in 
1990. This group thrived specifically in the East but was prevalent in both sides of the 
state prior to the reunification of Germany. Their platform centered on immigration and 
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being tired of the world seeing Germany as a lesser force. Following World War II, 
Germany took in the largest number of immigrants among European countries. While 
many of these immigrants were ethnic Germans returning after the war, those with a 
migration background quickly made up close to one-fifth of the population.14 This rapid 
influx of people coupled with a constant degradation of Germany for its actions in the 
war were highly conducive to the creation of right-wing populist groups. Throughout 
most of Western Europe, emigration from countries across the world occurred for 
decades after the end of the war. About 5% of the population in Western European states 
consisted of foreign immigrants by 1980 and steadily increased to 7% by 1999.15 
Germany’s role in accepting the largest number of immigrants among European countries 
provided a perfect opportunity for uneasiness and unwelcoming ideals. The rapid change 
creates fear which can lead to lashing out and violence against immigrants, who are 
perceived to be providing this new level of anxiety. 
While most returnees that were ethnically German were accepted with open arms, 
the same cannot be said for those of different backgrounds. The bringing together of two 
very different sides of government and thinking during reunification created resentment 
among the German population. The reunification brought up mob-type mentalities 
specifically within those worried about security and ethnic preservation. There was a 
stark rise in mob violence incidents with racial and xenophobic motives. Once the rates 
of immigration began to decrease in the 1990s, the violence against those with migration 
 
14 “On Integrating Immigrants in Germany,” Population and Development Review32, no. 3 (2006): 
pp. 597-599. 
15 Betz and Swank, 220. 
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backgrounds also slowed.16 While the post-war era consisted of continuous, rapid 
immigration into Germany up until reunification, these rates eventually diminished and 
those with xenophobic tendencies relaxed slightly in the mid-1990s in parallel. The graph 
below shows the net migration trends in Germany from 1960 to 2017.17 
Net Migration for Germany from 1962 to 2017 
 
An important characteristic of right-wing populist groups is their strict 
nationalistic nature. Instead of embracing new workers and outside ideas, they search 
more within the current community which, in their eyes, solely consists of ethnic 
Germans that share their same culture. They constantly stress the need for a unified 
nation using the criteria that only ethnic, non-migratory Germans can participate.18 The 
leaders often pull in supporters using the fear that immigrants are seeking to change the 
German composition and therefore weaken the overall German state. All outside forms of 
government and political gatherings are labelled as foreign ideas that are meant to break 
up the German people and infiltrate the government. Additionally, they link these foreign 
 
16 DOMiD, “Essay: Migration History in Germany,” accessed November 1, 2019. 
17 “Net Migration for Germany,” FRED, September 20, 2019. 
18 Liang, 166. 
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ideas with the Allied Powers that defeated Germany in World War II.19 By feeding off 
the fear of change and the resentment of German people toward the Allied Powers, the 
right-wing populist groups grew exponentially as thousands of foreigners entered the 
country. 
One group that is consistently used as a martyr for the party’s xenophobic ideals 
consists of those of Muslim decent. According to Germans, this group includes all those 
from Muslim countries regardless of their reason for migrating to Germany. Unlike other 
groups who are simply discriminated against, those in the Muslim population are 
considered a threat to society. Those who are outspoken in the party “estimate that over 
80 per cent of Muslims are fundamentalists who believe in the violent destruction of all 
non-Muslims.”20 Using various terrorist attacks across the world, these groups paint a 
picture of pure destruction if the Muslim population is allowed to migrate to Germany. 
While the ruling parties have often tried to curb this threat, they find that only extra 
integration programs and grouped housing allows for the safety of these immigrants.21 
The government holds a tough role in allowing people to express their opinions while 
also protecting all those who reside within the country permanently or temporarily.  
Post World War II’s trend toward globalization had many unknowns regardless of 
the later repercussions such as increased immigration and xenophobia. Prior to that, those 
within the middle and lower classes immediately shudder at the idea of globalization and 
its high costs and unknown benefits. The majority of the fear that right-wing populist 
groups feed off of comes from the unknown of the future, and the trend toward 
 
19 Liang, 147. 
20 Liang, 157-8. 
21 Liang, 157-8. 
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globalization was unprecedented at the time and provided a lot of anxiety for the general 
public. During the 1980s and 1990s, these groups received exponential support from 
those who were not excited to embrace the liberalization of economic restrictions and 
permeable borders that many mainstream political groups were preaching.22 The mass 
public provides a safety blanket for itself by vowing to stick up for those within the group 
when no clear outcome is evident. Any large change is daunting and the movement of the 
government toward western ideals seemed even less appealing than simple cooperation 
across borders.  
These fears once again link to the resentment of the West for their forced changes 
to governmental proceedings and constant shame for the atrocities done. One of the 
party’s priorities has been opposition to the European Union. The principal reason is for 
the suppressive nature of the Maastricht Treaty toward Germany specifically. They feel 
as though the European Union created precautionary measures that do not allow Germany 
to reach its full potential while also cutting down Germany’s sovereignty.23 It became 
easy to get caught up in the tangible goods, such as the burden of switching to the euro, 
that are apparent now instead of theorizing about the possible intangibles, such as larger 
free markets, of the future when surrounded by a group of like-minded people such as in 
these groups.  
Before reunification, the West German government implemented a guest worker 
program to find people to do the work that requires lots of travelling and less stability. 
Unfortunately, this initiative was quickly taken as another progressive, pan-European 
 
22 Betz and Swank, 223. 
23 Cas Mudde, “Die Republikaner,” inThe Ideology of the Extreme Right(Manchester; New York: 
Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 31-59, p.48. 
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idea.24 Even after reunification, the xenophobic tendencies against these workers was 
very high. Most of these initiatives began before the reunification which do not create a 
favorable environment for guest workers after 1990. Many of them were deported, had 
their work permits cut short, and experienced harassment or violent xenophobic acts.25 
The complete reversal of rhetoric for the guest workers confirms the increased hostility in 
East Germany over West Germany. 
Some scholars attribute the issues with guest workers to the East German 
government and their outward hostility toward immigration.26 When the state unified in 
1990, it brought the concentrated negative sentiments of East Germany and the guest 
worker programs of the West into direct contact. Within a few years of reunification, 
many guest workers were driven away. After successfully forcing the immigrants out, 
immigration rates slowed and the negative sentiments no longer had a prevalent outlet. 
During the mid-1990s the support for right-wing parties became much less vocal such as 
the Republikaner. 
As shown in the mid-1990s, right-wing groups feed off of these xenophobic 
tendencies but also struggle without migrants to exercise them on. After the reunification, 
these groups were highly followed and supported along with the rise of the anti-
immigration sentiments. Once the immigration rates began to reduce, The Republikaner 
lost support. These rates slowed because the government began to change the legislation 
surrounding immigration and asylum seeking. Germany found that many asylum seekers 
 
24 Göktürk Deniz, David Gramling, and Anton Kaes, Germany in Transit: Nation and Migration, 
1955-2005(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), p.23. 
25 Deniz, Gramling, and Kaes, 69. 
26 Deniz, Gramling, and Kaes, 69. 
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were travelling through several safe states before reaching Germany, creating an unequal 
influx of people. In 1993 they implemented the Asylum Compromise. This legislation 
outlined that all asylum seekers who passed through other safe states before reaching 
Germany would no longer be allowed to seek asylum in Germany. This was successful in 
curbing the influx since Germany is surrounded by safe states.27 After reunification in 
1990 and the Asylum Compromise in 1993, the Republikaner began to struggle with 
support. Their main tactic of using fear was no longer as prevalent of a sentiment as it 
had been in the 1980s.  
The government also began implementing more measures that integrated 
immigrants into German culture and society. The government debated and eventually 
implemented dual citizenship to aid in the integration process. This allowed the 
immigrants to fully accept the society they were entering without having to give up all 
ties to their home country. Although it was not originally widely accepted by the German 
population, several methods of grassroots movements popularized the idea throughout the 
masses. One institution that preached dual citizenship was the church systems. Further, 
the newspapers emphasized the need for better integration into and understanding of the 
German culture by immigrants.28 While dual citizenship allowed immigrants to better 
accept their lives in Germany, it also created a norm that German citizens did not need to 
be ethnically German which silenced many of the right-wing populist groups for a few 
 
27 DOMiD. 
28 Jeffrey T Checkel, “The Europeanization of Citizenship?,” in Transforming Europe: 
Europeanization and Domestic Change, ed. Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso, and Thomas 
Risse (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 180-197, p.189. 
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years.29 The Republikaner lost support and no longer posed a large threat going into the 
late 1990s due to many of these changes in norms. 
Along with the addition of dual citizenship, the government began prioritizing 
immigrants’ rights while also emphasizing better integration programs. In 2005, the 
Statistical Federal Office created a clear definition of those having a migration 
background. It labels all those who entered Germany after 1949 or have any immediate 
connection to another country either themselves or to a parent as having a migratory 
background.30 This definition was extremely important because it allowed the 
government to better understand the population they needed to integrate as well as 
perpetuated the norm of German citizens being more than simply ethnic Germans. After 
creating this definition, the government could more adequately focus on the asylum 
seeking and recent immigrant group. 
The Grand Coalition was the government that made the first tangible steps toward 
creating integration policy. In 2006, Angela Merkel held the first Integration Summit in 
which leaders of the community, religious heads, media, unions, and migrants were 
invited to participate. The wide spread of participants intentionally allowed people to be a 
part of the process of creating this inclusive legislation. The most important finding that 
triggered this summit involved the success rates of children in school. The Programme 
for Student Assessment found that students with different backgrounds had differing 
success rates in school and the government took this as a direct cause of poor integration 
for those students and families with migration backgrounds.31 Because of the 
 
29 Checkel, 190. 
30 DOMiD. 
31 DOMiD. 
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prioritization of the German culture and raising expectations for anyone attempting to 
stay in Germany, those who originally opposed immigration waited to see the outcomes 
of these new government programs. Their most pressing concern was the acceptance of 
asylum seekers as they did not choose to leave their home countries and thus were 
possibly less likely to assimilate into the German way of life. 
The same government also identified the consistent hostility toward those of 
Muslim decent and chose to tackle that separately. In addition to the Integration Summit 
they also held an Islam Summit in which Muslim organizations worked with the 
government to find better ways to accelerate the integration for Muslim people 
specifically.32 The government wanted to make a visible effort to show the people that 
they would not simply allow thousands of immigrants into the country without taking 
care of the German culture. Their way of doing this was through the writing of “a new 
national integration plan, the creation of a state ministry for integration and the initiation 
of the German Islam conference.”33 
The new national integration plan of 2005 included the implementation of 
mandatory courses for those who were not proficient in the German language. Courses of 
either six hundred or nine hundred hours of language instruction as well as a forty-five 
minute cultural integration session were highly recommended to those who needed it.34 
With the number of people migrating to or seeking asylum in Germany stagnant 
throughout the late 1990s and into the 2000s, the integration programs were given time to 
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work out the kinks. This period was also a fairly stable time for the government which 
gave it the confidence to implement large programs like the national integration plan and 
calm the skeptics. By this point, the Republikaner’s support had mostly splintered off into 
separate political groups as the government continued to create policies that curbed the 
anxiety of the masses. 
From 2005 until 2013, the stagnation of immigration ended. In 2005, those with a 
migration background made up close to 19% of the total population. This amount slowly 
increased to 19.5% by 2011 and began its rapid accent to 20.5% just two years later.35 
Unfortunately for the government, these numbers continued to rise exponentially for 
several years creating the migration crisis in 2015 and 2016. Along with the rise in 
migration also came a stark increase in asylum seekers. From 2012 to 2013 Germany 
experienced a 70% increase in applications totaling to 109,580 applications and 60% 
more the following year. Most of the applications were from war-ridden countries such as 
Syria, Serbia, and Kosovo. The largest issue with the mass arrivals was the lack of ample 
time to prepare. The cities and camps quickly became overcrowded with refugees and all 
of the work the government put into the integration plan in 2005 was no longer relevant. 
Additionally, the quick resources and shelters put together during this crisis were not 
sustainable in the long term and thus created another problem for the government that had 
so recently found its footing.36 Obviously, the large acceptance of immigrants and asylum 
seekers quickly awakened the sleeping right-wing populist groups and thus we see the 
quick rise of the AfD, the most current right-wing populist group.  
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Today, the same influx of immigrants that occurred in each large outbreak of 
right-wing populist sentiments is continuing to happen again. The migration crisis that 
rocked Europe spread right-wing populist groups across the continent. Specifically in 
Germany, people became increasingly protective of their way of life even if that means 
denying others a safe place to be. More explicitly, the migration crisis is a large influx of 
asylum seekers and immigrants specifically from Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and 
North Africa. The majority of the people brought very little with them as they fled from 
war-ridden, chaotic countries. In 2016, the close to 200,000 people attempting to migrate 
or seek asylum in Europe found the Western Balkan route closed. The EU-Turkey 
agreement also worked to end illegal migration from Turkey into the EU, putting a strain 
on the Mediterranean route.37  
The Mediterranean route created thousands of casualties and hundreds captured as 
small boats attempted to transport people from North Africa to Europe. Of the number of 
migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean in 2015, 3,771 were either found dead or 
went missing.38 While the EU-Turkey deal eased the massive flow of migrants entering 
from Turkey, the strain on the Mediterranean was not only deadly but also added stress to 
those countries that quickly became more likely to process asylum seekers such as Spain, 
Cyprus, and Italy. In turn, due to proximity, this placed a larger burden on Germany 
because the country is just inland of those hotspots. Unlike other countries across Europe 
that could easily adopt a no-immigration policy, Germany’s centralized position in both 
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the European Union and physically within the continent forced the government to take 
action.39 All refugees that were received were taken to camps where they could be 
processed and either granted asylum or turned away.  
The European Union quickly mandated the Dublin Regulation which made the 
first country people sought asylum in would be the country to make the determination on 
their status as a refugee for the entirety of the European Union. This criteria stemmed 
from the need to stop people from claiming asylum in multiple countries after being 
turned away. Some found this to be harsh as several countries were stricter in their 
acceptance rate thus making it more desirable to make it to Germany or other more 
accepting countries before claiming asylum.40 The chancellor of Germany, Angela 
Merkel, understood the unique position Germany found itself in as being surrounded by 
safe states and thus began taking in as many asylum seekers as possible. The struggle was 
immediately felt by the people as they watched their cities fill with unknown people who  
were fleeing their home countries and needed substantial help. Unlike immigrants who 
choose to leave their home country, asylum seekers only leave for survival which creates 
questions as to how much they are willing to integrate into society. Right-wing populism 
capitalized on this uncertainty and exploited the fears of the public. 
Alternative for Germany was founded in 2013 and within a few short years 
shattered the precedent for right-wing populist groups in terms of support. In 2017, the 
AfD surpassed the 5% threshold to gain seats in the Bundestag with 13.3% of the 
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population vote and has continued to grow since.41 They currently hold the third largest 
number of seats at 91 of the 709 seats and because of the coalition between the top two 
parties, are the largest opponent to the ruling coalition.42 We find this rapid awakening of 
protectionist and xenophobic sentiments parallel to the exponential influx of asylum 
seekers and immigrants just like in the past. Unfortunately for the ruling party, there 
seems to be very little they can do to in preventative measures. Groups like the AfD start 
their movements with whispers through the masses and create a narrative around the fear 
of the unknown as immigrants flooded into the country. Instead of recognizing the 
integration programs and temporary measures that are in place, the AfD amplifies the 
worst case scenario and ties it to the newcomers. 
The AfD, much like many right-wing populist groups before it, mostly wants to 
protect their Christian society especially against those with a Muslim background. Their 
Christian values are seen as intrinsic to everyday life and they refuse to let anyone from 
other religions take that away. They also believe in Germany as a Christian state and 
express the need for state support through encouraging German couples to have more 
children to protect the German race and culture from outsiders while simultaneously 
growing the ethnic German population.43 The AfD understands that one of the key ways 
to protect the German culture is to create a larger constituent base. They continue to 
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preach hostility for those of Muslim background and highlight the key discrepancies 
between Christianity and Islam.  
Although the AfD was not around when globalization first took flight after World 
War II, the party asserts many of the original ideologies of right-wing populism at the 
time. It continues to be highly critical and skeptical of the European Union and 
consistently points out the injustices Germany has been given since leaning into 
globalization. The party disagrees with a few key arguments, one of which will be 
discussed here. The first two involve the euro as an economic disadvantage and the 
general size of the European Union. The third involves sovereignty. This third qualm is 
most important in terms of immigration because during times like the migration crisis, 
Germany was forced to take in thousands of refugees and had very little choice in the 
matter because of its international agreements.44 This is a clear example of the 
government making decisions for the people, and the people dealing with the 
consequences. While right-wing populism might be drastic at times, their emphasis is 
always on the individual citizen over the mass of newcomers.  
One way that the AfD continues to prosper and focus on the individuals is their 
tactics for the types of issues they choose -to tackle politically. They often choose to 
discuss topics that should have been taken care of by the European Union or have 
disadvantaged Germany through someone else’s doing. Instead of looking to face 
problems head on, they often use the European Union as a scapegoat.45 One example is 
the migration crisis as mentioned above. During the late 1990s and early 2000s as the 
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government was creating integration programs and implementing dual citizenship, the 
right-wing populist groups were nowhere to be found. Only after a large crisis where 
every country across the European Union struggled to cope, the AfD comes alive and 
gains support quickly. The fear of outsiders infiltrating their lives moves them to 
xenophobic acts against immigrants and the denouncement of multiculturalism regardless 
of the policy changes that were implemented to keep everyone happy.  
Looking at the last few years alone, Germany drastically increased its acceptance 
of asylum seekers every year with the jump from 2015 to 2016 being the highest during 
the peak of the migration crisis and continued on an upward trend from there. In 2016, 
Germany accepted 669,482 applications which was a 111.78% increase from 2015. 2017 
brought a 44.93% increase from 2016 and 2018 totaled an acceptance of 1,063,837 
applications for asylum.46 While there were not nearly as many people seeking asylum in 
the 1980s when the Republikaner became a force to be reckoned with, the AfD is in a 
much more strategic position today than the Republikaner ever was. This is in direct 
correlation to the majority of immigrants being asylum seekers instead of economic 
immigrants. 
One of the main differences between the AfD and right-wing populist parties that 
came before it is their emphasis on immigration policy. Due to the asylum seekers of the 
migration crisis, right-wing populism has needed to change its priorities to continue to 
draw from a large audience. The AfD has a wide range of supporters who all share the 
same fear of change due to the asylum seekers just as former parties like it, but the 
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rhetoric has changed.47 Originally, those migrating to Germany in the 1980s were often 
seeking economic opportunity instead of safety. This meant they had skills to contribute 
to the workforce and were willing to take jobs that Germans might not so readily take. 
With asylum seekers, there is a large social, ethnic, and economic burden associated with 
every person accepted.  
Additionally, it is much harder to implement mandatory integration systems for a 
large influx of asylum seekers because the government is struggling to give them shelter 
and safety, let alone teach them German. As the AfD asserts, those who are already 
citizens of Germany should be the top priority of the government and preserving or 
bettering their way of life is the most important aspect of a government’s job. There 
might be a moral obligation to help asylum seekers who have nowhere to turn, but if that 
means sacrificing the lives of Germans, the AfD is not on-board. One of the principal 
tactics to calm the right-wing populist groups in prior events was the implementation of 
these integration programs that prioritized German culture just as the AfD is looking for. 
Unfortunately, the short timeline and continued flow of newcomers has created a 
challenging situation for the current ruling coalition and now they have to handle the AfD 
in the national government as well as among the masses. 
This chapter discussed the importance of globalization and immigration for the 
platforms of right-wing populist groups. The Republikaner fed off of globalization more 
specifically and cemented their voices in the fight against the guest workers. With 
immigration levels dwindling from the mid-1990s to the late 2000s right-wing populism 
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took a slight hiatus but as shown by the quick rise of the AfD, could be revitalized at a 
moment’s notice. The AfD centers more on immigration issues as a result of increased 
globalization. With the coupling of leaning into the European Union and the rapid influx 
of immigrants starting in 2015, the AfD capitalized and is currently the third largest party 
in the German Parliament. 
The next chapters will discuss the economic trends and social welfare programs 
that, when coupled with the effects of globalization and immigration, are the perfect 
recipe for the rise in right-wing populist groups.  
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Chapter 3 – Economic Trends 
Several economists might argue that right-wing populism essentially only worries 
about immigration rates and that economic woes have nothing to do with their trends, but 
much of the research that dives into individual trends disagrees. While these parties often 
have more rhetoric surrounding immigration policy, this influx of citizens affects the 
economy and as immigration and asylum application rates decrease, the burden on the 
economy lessens, and thus the support for right-wing populism goes down. It is naive not 
to consider economic shocks when assessing the trends of right-wing populism. While 
the literature shows that right-wing groups pop up more frequently in regions that have 
demonstrated more radical ideals in the past, there is a parallel in radicalization in terms 
of support for right-wing populist groups and economic shocks.48 In this chapter I will 
explain the economic trends that affected right-wing populist support, but the next 
chapter will also play into this explanation as social welfare programs play a large role in 
how economic shocks affect the people. 
While most of the literature acknowledges that globalization is the key component 
responsible for the rise in right-wing populism, labor market shocks and other massive 
economic changes aid in this drive toward radicalization. The increased job insecurity as 
well as the opening of trade relations are cited as constant examples for increased 
support.49 The majority of these studies do not highlight government intervention in 
tandem with these shocks although they agree that globalization creates a split society 
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that can easily cause unrest. With the rapid changes in economy, groups that are less 
equipped to handle the shocks become the ‘losers’ of globalization. These ‘losers’ are 
more likely to revert to a herd-like mentality and support the party that promises them the 
most and shows them they matter. This trend can be seen through the rapid influx of 
support for the party and the overall emphasis on preserving German culture. This 
distress leads to the xenophobic, ethnocentric, radical thinking of right-wing populist 
parties. According to existing literature, people within this category are more likely to 
choose the less orthodox ways of thinking that is provided by these parties instead of the 
inclusive, multicultural nature of more left parties.50 
Hans-George Betz, a principal analyst in international politics, asserts his 
assessment on globalization and its various ‘winners’ and ‘losers'. Those who are 
consistently marginalized by the globalization process are “blue collar workers, young 
people with lower levels of education, and the unemployed.”51 The majority of these 
citizens are not living lavish lives in the center of metropolitan cities but instead more 
likely on the outskirts of town, barely making ends meet. These areas are often populated 
by a large portion of immigrants because they are the most affordable areas with the 
small amount they have to their name. As economic shocks come into play, the fear of 
being taken over by immigrants and losing their livelihoods becomes a very real 
possibility. Betz explains that their largest complaint with society is that they feel 
 
50 Colantone and Stanig, 939. 
51 Hans-George Betz, “The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in 
Western Europe,” Comparative Politics 25, no. 4 (1993): pp. 413-427, p.423. 
 
34 | Green 
 
completely abandoned. They often find themselves in economic traps that they are unable 
to escape from unaided due to the institutions that are in place.52  
Another economic repercussion from globalization is the growth in economic 
competition. Many people who align with right-wing populist groups are not only feeling 
increased fear of immigration rates but also of the ability of their firms and companies to 
keep up with international competitors. In this case, the international economic 
competition affects the domestic economic climate and puts marginalized groups even 
more on edge.53 For this exact reason, right-wing populist groups move toward 
governmental intervention in the form of social welfare programs for those who are most 
affected by economic shocks as long as they are not immigrants.54 While different 
analysts have different definitions in terms of who falls into that group specifically, most 
agree that the worst case scenario is experiencing an economic shock without substantial 
governmental compensation for ethnic Germans. 
One of the main draws to right-wing populism as explained in the first chapter is 
the shared fear of losing economic opportunities. While economic trends do not 
necessarily match up with the rise of right-wing populist groups as closely as 
globalization factors do, they are still a prevalent statistic that right-wing populist groups 
are dependent on. In a time of complete stability in economic terms, it is extremely 
difficult for these groups to gain support. As that stability begins to fade, the right-wing 
populist sentiments come out and the groups grow rapidly. One reason right-wing 
populist groups have gained support so quickly is because of the volatility in the 
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economic climate in Germany as a coupled effect with other crises. Only the 
government’s social welfare programs are strong enough to keep order and like Betz 
alludes to, welfare programs that aid those who are victims of the change are the easiest 
way to calm right-wing populist sentiments. 
After World War II German economic performance was growing rapidly. In the 
three decades after the end of the war, the country managed to keep their GDP growth 
around 5% and unemployment hit an all-time low at 0.6% by 1973. Unfortunately, after 
1973 economic performance decreased significantly and by the late 1980s, Germany had 
almost a 9% unemployment rate.55 This increase in unemployment directly correlates to 
the increase in right-wing populist support throughout Germany and specifically in the 
East. The Republikaner gained support very rapidly in the 1980s as people were watching 
and experiencing the spike in unemployment while the nerves of reunification mounted. 
Much of the research on unemployment focuses on structural aspects of society and how 
the institutions have changed with the different incentives created by the government.56 
Unfortunately, these rates did not get much better after reunification and the government 
was forced to increase its labor market initiatives. 
The reunification exacerbated a large crater in East German infrastructure and left 
many without jobs. Many of the firms in East Germany were completely uncompetitive. 
The East German infrastructure was no match for its western counterpart and this became 
 
55 Jeffrey A Hart, “Germany,” in Rival Capitalists: International Competitiveness in the United 
States, Japan, and Western Europe(Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press., 1992), pp. 181-
222, p.181. 
56 Viktor Steiner, “Labour Market Transitions and the Persistence of Unemployment: West 
Germany 1983 - 1992,” EconStor (Mannheim: Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung 
(ZEW), January 1, 1994), p.1. 
 
36 | Green 
 
extremely apparent when the western economy was struggling to keep the eastern side 
afloat in the market. Much of the world had advanced to capitalist structure while the 
East German economy was more traditional as a part of the Soviet Bloc. Instead of 
converting to capitalist infrastructure, the eastern government continued to stick with 
traditional export markets and unfortunately many of their trade partners were those in 
the Soviet Bloc. With the crumble of that faction and the move toward western practices, 
East Germany was left wildly unprepared to join the western world.57  
Thus, the western government was forced to implement completely new 
infrastructure and market structure across East Germany. The government began by 
implementing programs that privatized the existing firms in East Germany in an effort to 
create the path to competitiveness in the new capitalist environment. Additionally, the 
government needed to create self-sustaining practices that included the large industrial 
sector of the West. The overall goal for the West was to ignite the eastern economy using 
similar programs that helped western countries excel after World War II.58 The West 
depended on the East as much as the East depended on the West because they now 
constituted the same country and thus needed both sides to succeed in order for the entire 
country to grow. The western government’s rapid enforcement of social welfare 
programs on top of restructuring kept the government intact and allowed very little 
insurgency to rise up. 
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The Eastern market struggled significantly upon reunification largely due to the 
conversion to the same currency as the west, the deutsche Mark. This change was 
implemented by the 1990 Treaty for German Economic, Monetary, and Social Union, 
which was created in anticipation of reunification and the merging of two starkly 
different markets. The original currency of the East was the Ostmark which held 
significantly less value than the deutsche Mark especially when paying for high price 
items.59 The East German people were expecting to be given a 1:1 conversion even with 
the discrepancy in the value of the different currencies. As of 1989, the conversion was 
one deutsche Mark to 4.4 Ostmarks so employers and West German firms cautioned 
against a 1:1 gift to the East. The East’s economy was significantly lesser than that of the 
West and a 1:1 split would exacerbate this.60 The government settled on a 1:1 ratio up to 
4,000 deutsche Marks and a higher rate past this threshold as a compromise. This rate 
allowed for the closest possible conversion that set both economies up for success. While 
this policy would create large repercussions for the entire country in the years to come, it 
was a key component of accepting East Germany and setting it on a path of convergence 
with the western market.61 
This currency change forced many East German firms to pay workers at a largely 
inflated rate which was detrimental to many of their previous markets and labor force. 
The companies were forced to lay off considerable amounts of workers, contributing to 
the already rising unemployment rate. Unfortunately, many firms were left unaided as the 
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western government did not allocate nearly enough money to this project and thus a large 
portion of the burden was placed on the already suffering eastern firms themselves.62 
Since the economic stability of the East now directly affected the West, this budgetary 
miscalculation was hurtful to everyone. In a normal circumstance, the right-wing populist 
groups would be gaining rapid support and running rampant. Fortunately, after this 
shortfall by the government, they quickly enacted programs that directly targeted 
unemployed East German workers. The Republikaner began slowly losing support after 
these programs were implemented and was obsolete by 1995. This will be addressed 
more substantially in the next chapter, but without these programs, the unrest of the 
public would have been extremely high, creating a perfect environment for right-wing 
populism to grow. 
The worst part for the citizens of East Germany was the rapid decay of their 
livelihoods from one of the top countries in the Soviet Bloc to being essentially ripped 
down and built back up almost entirely by the western government. During the early 
1990s, the unemployment rate of East Germans skyrocketed with some areas in East 
Germany having close to 25 percent unemployment. Unfortunately, the industrial export 
market collapsed along with all other markets from the East and never quite recovered to 
its original output levels. By 1994, the unregistered unemployment rate was at 15 percent 
with 1.1 million people registered. A large portion of the population was also working 
part time and thus did not count in the unemployment bracket but were still not making a 
substantial living.63  
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The first five years after reunification were very telling for the East German 
economy and for Germany as a whole. Luckily for the sitting government, the right-wing 
populist groups were just as jumbled as the infrastructure system which is a large reason 
the Republikaner slowly dwindled in the 1990s and eventually disappeared from policy. 
The western government was also transparent with its rhetoric and the German citizens 
understood that in order to be competitive internationally, restructuring the East German 
market was crucial. If there is a tangible, economic goal in sight and the government is 
actively helping those who are normally neglected, populations will rarely rise up in 
protest. This left the western government room to implement its many social welfare 
programs that kept anti-government sentiments at bay.  
Luckily, the programs enacted by the government in the beginning of the 1990s 
began to pay off in the second half of the decade. The manufacturing sector in the East 
began increasing its output with 28 percent growth between 1995 and 1998. Also, per 
capita output increased significantly. At the beginning of reunification, per capita output 
was 30 percent of West Germany’s and by 1996 had jumped to 56 percent. After this 
swift increase, the progress began to slow but this positive growth allowed the entire 
country to breathe a sigh of relief. By the mid-1990s it became apparent that while the 
government’s economic programs were painful at first, they were delivering the benefits 
they promised in a reasonable amount of time. Real wages and productivity rates also 
rose with most East German households’ incomes reaching at least 75 percent of their 
western counterparts by 1998. These effects can be directly linked to the restructuring of 
infrastructure and capital stock throughout East Germany.64 Right-wing populism quickly 
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lost its gusto as the economic situation of East Germans improved and the public was 
willing to wait out these policies.  
Coupled with the disorganization of the Republikaner party, right wing populist 
sentiments were fairly quiet during this restructuring process because of many of the 
social welfare policies that the government implemented. Although these programs were 
not perfect, they substantially decreased the amount of people without an income 
altogether. Many of the programs were specifically aimed at helping people from East 
Germany who lost their jobs directly due to reunification and restructuring. These 
programs directly combatted the spike in economic woes during the 1990s and provided 
at least a small sense of comfort to the public. The social welfare programs and their 
effects will be further discussed in the next chapter. 
The direct approach of the western government allowed for quick success across 
the country. One of the most influential programs on the wellbeing of the population was 
the subsidy program that targeted “export-oriented firms” in order to endorse the process 
of “fixed-capital formation.”65 Along with other investments and special provisions to aid 
in capital accumulation, the West German government also emphasized the need for 
substantial research and development within each firm especially as their markets 
changed so drastically.66 Without these programs, many of the East German firms that 
survived likely would not have. The very intentional investment in East German firms 
and overall wellbeing was key in keeping right-wing sentiments down. Other than a few 
xenophobic violent acts in 1991, the government successfully kept those on the fringe 
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from jumping into right-wing populism as seen in the previous decade.67 Large market 
transitions such as the restructuring of the entirety of the East German infrastructure in 
just a few short years had large potential to add to the rhetoric of right-wing populist 
groups, but with the correct approach by the government, these battles were avoided and 
the convergence between the two economic sides of the country continued as seamlessly 
as possible into the 21st century.  
From the 1990s to the mid-2000s, these programs successfully kept down the 
nerves and boosted nationalism throughout Germany. For the first time since the Cold 
War and the separation of the country, Germany was proud of where it was headed. 
Although the unemployment rates were still relatively high throughout this period, people 
knew this high rate would not last long. In 2005 the unemployment rate peaked and then 
quickly began its descent until present day as shown in the graph below.68  
Total Unemployment Rate in Germany from 1991 to 2019 
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The restructuring and revitalizing of the labor market was officially bearing fruit after 
almost 15 years since reunification.69 While this is normally too long of a time to wait 
before becoming restless as a population, the mass of government programs that targeted 
the exact people who were marginalized by these changes instead created trust and 
confidence in their government. People are able to overlook a few years of grit if they are 
given a tangible timeline with programs that are specifically placed and carried out. 
Public masses often rally with each other through these hard times as long as the 
government is being transparent and genuine.  
The programs that were most specific in terms of revitalizing the labor market 
were subsidizing the private sector to endorse job creation and restructuring the job-
placement services sector. These programs, while setting clear guidelines for 
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unemployment benefits, mainly attacked the labor market issues from both bottom-up 
and top-down.70 Additionally, from 1998 to 2002 the government increased its funding to 
these programs. During this time, the relative expenditures of the government increased 
from 34.6 percent to 43.6 percent. The government saw the need to increase budgetary 
expenditures for the labor market to speed up the recovery. From 2003 to 2006 
expenditures once again drastically increased and climbed to 38.7 billion euros being put 
directly into the labor market. As they saw the unemployment rate finally start to fall in 
2005, they decreased this total amount but continued with targeted policies and began to 
watch their hard work pay off.71 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, a large complaint of the AfD is the 
introduction of the euro. Much of the reason this change did not ignite complaints earlier 
is due to its gradual implementation. There was a three year changeover period that 
allowed people to gradually begin using euros starting on January 1, 1999. They were 
still taken as payment until February of 2002 because of a joint agreement between the 
retail and banking sectors to allow a complete and seamless transition.72 Without these 
strategic actions, the East German market in particular may not have been able to sustain 
another rapid change in currency. The reason the AfD is opposed to the euro is because 
they believe Germany was cheated into using this new currency and that they have lost 
out on economic prosperity because of it.73 The euro is the equivalent of almost two 
deutsche Marks which requires conversion of all products and adjustment for the people. 
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The government understood that this adoption was a necessary step in integrating Europe 
which is another large complaint of the AfD. Regardless of their thoughts, the gradual 
implementation of the euro was the difference between increased economic unrest and 
containing the fears of the public. 
Additionally, the economic crisis in 2008 placed a large burden on Germany’s 
economy and the entire population looked to Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany, 
to fix the problem. While Germany began to finally reap the benefits of all the hard work 
put into the economy from 1995 to 2005, Europe partially blamed Germany for the 
economic crisis that started in Greece and spread quickly to the peripheral countries of 
the EU. Those quick to point fingers saw issues with Germany’s continuous wage 
increases and export performance since it drove prices up across the EU and allowed 
German companies a competitive edge over other firms. These scholars also label 
Germany as a large beneficiary of the euro, which is highly contended domestically.74  
The rescue package put together by the top countries in the EU became a highly 
contentious topic in Germany. While Angela Merkel tried to negotiate a fair package that 
both protected the hard work of the German people in recent decades and helped the 
countries in need, her actions were not well received. The German people regarded 
Merkel as a more frugal chancellor and argued that the wage rates and high levels of 
exports are due to the many social welfare programs and budget balancing actions taken 
prior to this point. With the rescue package, German taxpayers were now obligated to 
send much of their hard work across borders to countries that did not go through the 
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painstaking process of reunification. Unfortunately for Merkel, the rescue package began 
the slow decline of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) with a loss of 
10% in key districts during the election in 2010.75 It is clear that this marked the 
beginning of the switch from rational politics to right-wing populism. 
Fast forwarding to 2013, the AfD gained quick support from the public. From 
reunification there was a common idea of Eastern Deprivation. This idea came about 
under the constant understanding that the more recently formed eastern states needed 
more help and aid than western states. For the first few decades after reunification, the 
West simply needed to help the East if the entire country wanted to excel to the top. But 
after waiting for about two decades, this sentiment did not subside as the government 
might have hoped. The AfD received a significant portion of its support from eastern 
states that had higher economic unrest. Especially in the later elections such as the one in 
2017 when the party actually gained seats in the Bundestag, the high rates of 
unemployment and low GDP coincided with high support for the AfD.76 
Many of the voters that began supporting the AfD were from major parties or did 
not vote in previous recent elections. This switch can be attributed to the “uneven 
distribution of economic strength, disposable income, and access to the labor market” that 
are especially prevalent between East and West Germany.77 Even after decades of market 
rehabilitation, the benefits were short term and have created large structural issues 
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throughout Germany that hold the advantage in Western German states. The majority of 
the voters that switched to the AfD were from economically poor constituent bases. 
Within these states, there remained large discrepancies in the economic and demographic 
factors. The unemployment rate averaged 34% and the percentage of individuals 
qualifying for social welfare programs was 37% higher than the average for all of 
Germany. Additionally, both disposable income and economic strength averaged 14% 
and 23% below the rest of the country respectively.78 
Many political analysts also note that the AfD does not follow this exact structure 
of economic unrest determining increased right-wing populist sentiments. There are a 
significant number of states that are also economically stable and have high support for 
the AfD.79 This is important to note because right-wing populist groups are never 
dependent on only one aspect of the political climate. Economic unrest is only one 
portion of the draw to right-wing populist groups. In the case of the more well-off 
supporters, it is understandable that while they are comfortable in their employment and 
their income, they are tired of constantly having to pick up the slack of the eastern states.  
The ability to not only draw from several different socio-economic groups, as 
well as persuade voters who abstained previously, is how the AfD has been so successful 
even with certain government programs in place to reduce their growth. Not every state 
in East Germany is poor and West Germany rich which is exactly what gives the AfD a 
comparative advantage in terms of economic policy.80 Their breadth of supporters from 
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all economic backgrounds helps explain their rise to becoming the third largest party 
seemingly overnight.  
The rhetoric surrounding right-wing populist groups and economic stability varies 
significantly depending on the economic climate of the time since these groups have 
continued to adapt. While some authors believe economic climate is not essential to the 
platform of right-wing populist groups, I assert that it increases participation and drives 
more extreme views. One of the few ways the German government was able to stay on 
top of groups like the AfD for so long was its dedication to social welfare programs that 
specifically target the groups that were most affected and least cared for. Much of that 
group was from East Germany which explains the slow decline of the Republikaner and 
the rapid growth of the AfD decades later. While these groups may not center their 
platforms on economic policies, they feed off of economic unrest in tandem with 
increased globalization. While the rises and falls of economic trends are not exactly 
parallel with those of right-wing populist groups, without social welfare programs to 
catch the disadvantaged, these trends can boost support for right-wing populist groups. 
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Chapter 4 – Social Welfare Programs and Active Labor Market Initiatives 
Social Welfare programs can be the difference between public support for a 
government and uncontrollable unrest. The government plays an instrumental role in 
curbing the anxieties of the general public and these programs provide a safety net for 
those on the edge of slipping into unemployment. Programs that prioritize those in the 
population who are likely to suffer from economic changes due to globalization are the 
best way to prevent widespread panic while working toward economic prosperity. As 
shown in the previous chapter regarding economic trends, the large ebbs and flows of the 
economy are extremely variable and instability increased after reunification in 1990. The 
principal reason right-wing populist groups were not as prevalent during this spike in 
unemployment and economic unrest is due to the social welfare programs established in 
Germany and the government’s willingness to alter the programs as the attitudes around 
them changed. This chapter will address this exact proposition while outlining the social 
welfare programs and active labor market initiatives that were key to curbing right-wing 
populism for so long and why the AfD was able to break the dry spell for these groups. 
Before the 1990s, the government had more hands-off policy in terms of social 
welfare programs. The economy in each sector of Germany was stable and did not need 
much in terms of safety nets to catch the unemployed. This being said, there was still 
social security and unemployment benefit programs for those who did find themselves 
unemployed. Most scholars agree that systems that create the most comprehensive 
coverage of citizens who are at risk from falling into the lowest income bracket as well as 
active labor market programs are the easiest way for a government to prevent right-wing 
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populism from rising.81 A government that is involved in the wellbeing of its citizens is 
more likely to have their support, especially in times of need. In this case, if insecurities 
do arise, the safety net programs are there to provide aid until the market stabilizes again. 
With the reunification, the western government was forced to not only extend its 
already existing programs to those in East Germany but also modify them to 
accommodate for the rapid influx of people qualifying. The adjustments strategically 
targeted East Germans specifically. The government implemented an early-retirement 
program as well as more active labor market programs. These programs included job 
creation projects and incentives for firms to retrain those integrating from the East. All 
the firms involved in the programs were given subsidies from the government to entice 
them to participate. Additionally, the government created short term work projects that 
allowed East Germans to temporarily continue earning the same income as they did 
before reunification. Not only did these policies ignite the markets toward convergence, 
they also illustrated the dedication the government was willing to put into the eastern 
market.82  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the government was not completely selfless 
during the creation of the labor market and social security programs specifically for the 
East. In order for the entire German market to survive, the western government knew 
there would need to be a nearly seamless convergence between the markets which 
included taking care of those suffering from the restructuring process.83 The general 
understanding was that the western government needed to show full dedication to those 
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suffering in the East or unrest would quickly turn to outrage and could ruin the entire 
country. Without this key agenda, the Republikaner would have gained support again and 
may not have disappeared so quickly. 
East German social welfare protection began with the Unification Treaty which 
agreed to transfer all existing West German political, social, and economic programs to 
the East at the beginning of reunification. The population falling under these programs 
increased from 65 million to 81 million people with the addition of East Germans.84 This 
proved to be a hefty test for the infrastructure of the West German welfare state but 
ultimately the government was willing to continue to alter the system as needed in order 
to keep the country afloat and unite the people under one government successfully.  
After implementing the Unification Treaty, the government increased the eastern 
social security budget substantially in 1991. While this influx of funds did not fix all of 
the problems in East Germany overnight, the government was hopeful. Unfortunately, 
“total public social expenditures ballooned from 23.2 percent of GDP in 1990 to 27.6 
percent in 1993, while the federal budget deficit grew from .1 percent of GDP in 1989 to 
3.5 percent in 1993.”85 With the Republikaner still having a foothold in German politics, 
the government knew time was of the essence. Specific programs were implemented for 
East Germans who were unemployed due to the market restructuring process. As 
mentioned above, the early-retirement programs and active labor market projects targeted 
East Germans and kept the masses from running to the Republikaner or more far-right 
groups.86 These programs are part of the reason the Republikaner lost its household name 
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around 1995 and the next prominent right-wing populist group, the AfD, did not emerge 
until 2013. 
The active labor market projects were a collaboration between the government, 
unions, and employer associations. They created training programs and placement 
agencies that worked specifically with East Germans. The agencies focused on both short 
and long-term employment to minimize the number of people without any income. East 
Germans who were unemployed because of reunification were the top priority and all 
programs were well financed by government institutions even with the growing budget 
deficit.87 Due to the number of programs, the total amount of social expenditures 
increased from 24.8 percent to 29.6 percent of GDP during the first five years after 
reunification.  This growth directly combats the various economic shocks, such as 
increased unemployment rate, because they focus on the wellbeing of each individual.88 
Although the unemployment rate was high throughout this period, the people saw first-
hand the different policies being put in place to help East Germans in particular which 
provided comfort to the general public and illustrated the government’s consideration of 
the working class as a whole. Thus, it is no surprise that the Republikaner died out by 
1995 even with rising unemployment rates.  
From 1994 to 1998, the Kohl government introduced more social welfare reforms 
that focused on “fiscal consolidation” and adapting to the constantly changing societal 
norms and economic status. Unfortunately, this campaign was too rigid for the country 
because this consolidation ended up costing the government its power in 1998 and did 
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little in terms of new legislation that helped the general population.89  On the other hand, 
the Schröder administration moved in in 1998, learned from the mistakes of the previous 
government, and expanded social welfare expenditures and payback programs. This 
government extended social security measures to those who were working less than 15 
hours per week while simultaneously putting more funding into reimbursing taxes to 
those in lower wage brackets. The goal was to universalize more help to lower wage 
workers through social protection measures.90 The programs in place to specifically help 
workers who were employed but only part time allowed more time for the market to 
settle and continue convergence toward western levels of output and revenue. They also 
settled any possible beginnings of anti-government, right-wing populist thoughts by 
directly focusing on those who were still marginalized in the system by going beyond 
existing programs. 
By now, political elections and all political party platforms centered on social 
welfare and unemployment. The 1998 election set the precedent for decades to come as 
the political parties that held the most seats created an era that was known for its social 
policy reform. With the Social-Democratic Party (SPD) now in power, the rhetoric 
shifted a little to emphasize individualization and prevent people from exploiting the 
unemployment benefits system. The era from 1998 to 2009 was key in implementing 
social welfare programs and finally getting on top of the unemployment rate. This 
government went back to a more traditional German welfare structure with an emphasis 
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on making sure people are not cheating the system. The two-tiered unemployment 
insurance system allowed people to gain benefits for an unlimited amount of time as long 
as they fit a certain income criteria. One of the tiers was tax-funded to create 
accountability and allow those with lower incomes to get help. The other was based on 
individual contributions in the past which could be paid for by the program for a total of 
32 months. They made the programs slightly more universal than the traditional system 
but the overall principles of receiving unemployment when needed while also imposing 
accountability for those taking from the system as well.91 During the Schröder 
administration’s first term, much of the policy was put in place to stabilize the market and 
shift the burden of financing from the government to the revenue sector which was key to 
reducing taxpayers’ burden and thus began to spread the responsibility more evenly 
between East and West Germany.  
The next era of the Schröder administration emphasized the importance of self-
reliance and being able to rely on those around you to help in times of need. The 
Schröder government did not take away welfare systems but instead restructured them to 
encourage people to take responsibility and invest in the economy. The government had 
long instituted the important role of universal banks and their aid in allowing employees 
across all sectors to take ownership and become shareholders in firms. The universal 
banks in particular created a push toward a positive relationship between employees and 
employers through this encouragement of ownership.92 Long-term investments are the 
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exact influxes of money that allow firms to further their worker training programs and 
keep more employees full-time. This push to revamp labor market relations is one of the 
beginning actions that the Schröder government took to create a more forward-looking 
policy. 
Beginning in 2004 the unemployment system was drastically changed to reflect 
the new goal of more self-reliance. The government knew that it could not take all of the 
welfare policies away but instead that they could encourage those who get help from the 
programs to instead help themselves more. Prior to 2004, the unemployment 
compensation program covered all those who paid into the social insurance in previous 
years, those who did not have insurance, and all others. The government split the burden 
between two bureaucracies and all of the help was need-based. Both prior income and the 
amount of time unemployed were taken into account when providing benefits. 
Additionally, the placement agencies as mentioned above were implemented at the local 
level which provided variation but was more individualized than previous infrastructure 
and focused more on intermediate areas of the labor market that needed more workers.93 
The universalized programs were the ignition to pushing those in lower income brackets 
to be able to stand on their own and these programs quickly paid off as unemployment 
rates dropped starting in 2005. 
While the welfare programs of the 1990s were not long-term, sustainable policies, 
they were instrumental in getting East Germany on the path to convergence with West 
Germany. These programs created large deficits in the government budget that needed to 
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be addressed later, but their main purpose was to support East Germany in a time of large 
transition and they were successful.94 The constantly adapting welfare system provided 
benefits for a wide-array of people and prioritized those marginalized by the system. The 
largest constituent base of right-wing populist groups was thus fundamentally taken care 
of and supported. Much of the rhetoric around right-wing populism is the need to shake 
up the system that is not providing the benefits it is supposed to. In a large transition like 
reunification, the government very easily could have prioritized GDP growth without 
being willing to take the backwards steps to rebuild and create lasting prosperity. 
Additionally, the strategic social welfare programs may have required slightly more 
recovery in future years, which I address next, but were instrumental in keeping public 
unrest at a minimum and right-wing populist groups from rising throughout this 
vulnerable period. 
As both sides of the country progressed in total revenues and decreasing 
unemployment rate, the government became more restrictive in its criteria for receiving 
benefits. By 2005, West Germany had been subsidizing East Germany for almost 15 
years and was ready to create a more well-rounded system of self-reliance. The programs 
that were in place did not disappear but the government was less eager to point people 
toward them. Instead, they encouraged people into the intermediary market even if it was 
not the job they were looking for.95 One of Schröder’s main platforms from the beginning 
was the idea of providing agents for active citizenry instead of handing out 
unemployment aid at no cost.96 The tightening of benefits was targeted at those trying to 
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game the system and simply earn unemployment benefits instead of actively looking for a 
job. This example is one of the main reasons for a rapid switch in social welfare rhetoric 
from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. Specifically those in the West were becoming tired 
of supporting those in East Germany so the government compromised by scaling back the 
programs but refusing to scrap them altogether. 
The important distinction in this change in policy is that self-reliance is not the 
same as individualization. The German population defines these changes as leaning on 
each other instead of the government and social welfare systems. Not only did this policy 
ensure that everyone was pulling equal weight among local communities but that 
neighbors would help each other in times of need, generating a strong social network.97 
This shift took much of the burden off the government and ultimately off the shoulders of 
the taxpayers. It also implemented a more local approach to curbing insecurities as the 
people relied on each other to make it through tough times but still had the government to 
fall on if necessary. The government found that the majority of the population wanted to 
actively provide for themselves and those around them. Overall, the government pushed 
to create both an active and a self-reliant population that collectively cared for the 
wellbeing of the state and each other.98  
The alterations to the social welfare system created more localized programs that 
provided one-on-one support for people who were unemployed. The largest difference 
between these more-current programs and former ones was the need for more 
documentation and proof of hardship in order to receive benefits. One large complaint of 
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those consistently paying taxes and funding these programs was about “free-riders.”99 
With the stabilization of the unemployment rate, the government needed to adapt to the 
new demands of the people. They came up with the Hartz Acts which are specific 
guidelines explaining the circumstances under which a person can receive benefits. The 
Hartz Acts were part of an overarching policy change called Agenda 2010 that was 
principal in the government’s goal of creating self-reliance as well as making it harder for 
free loaders as explained above.100  
The Hartz Acts redefined the entitlement structure that originally individualized 
the labor market and the social welfare system as a more comprehensive, cohesive 
program. This policy married Unemployment Assistance and the local job-creation 
agencies by outlining stricter income status and living standards needed to receive the 
same benefits as before. Social policy like the Hartz Acts allows the local governmental 
employment agencies to decide on unemployment benefits and force people to actively 
look for a job. Basically, the social welfare system no longer benefits those under long-
term unemployment because it was now assumed the person was not seeking a job at 
all.101 This policy may have had more push back in the previous years but since 
unemployment rates declined rapidly starting in 2005, the government did not need to be 
as lenient in order to ensure general contentment throughout the population. Additionally, 
it can be assumed that this policy also helped ignite the decline in unemployment rate 
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because it forced people into jobs that were not their first choice but provided them an 
income regardless. While seemingly harsh, the government truly began to take all 
taxpayers into account regardless of which income bracket they fell into. It was time that 
wealthier citizens were not required to support those who choose to be picky about 
employment. 
The long-term unemployed were forced to lean on those around them or to take 
the first job offered to them. For anyone who was unemployed and did not accept a job or 
training offer, their benefits could be cut by 30%. The rhetoric was extremely harsh on 
those just entering the market since the same choice could cut them from benefits 
completely for three months. The idea behind these strict policies were to cut free-riders 
off from unemployment benefits and instead focus on increasing employment for those 
who are able, especially younger people entering the market.102 While these stringent 
policies put a lot of pressure on the unemployed to find a job, it took the weight off the 
government to fund these people and instead incited a general feeling of responsibility for 
both individual and communal wellbeing. These reforms were seen as a positive, 
specifically in the middle class since they were consistently paying the taxes that funded 
these entities. Now, the government had successfully found a source of income for those 
unemployed, listened to the worries of the middle class, and set economic indicators like 
unemployment rate on a downward trend for the first time since reunification.  
Strategically, each of the Hartz Acts were aimed at a different section of the 
economy with all acts having the underlying goal of promoting active market policy. In 
addition to urging people to take part time jobs instead of always seeking full time 
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employment, the Second Hartz Act encouraged people to consider becoming self-
employed by creating a subsidy for them. The government wanted to continue the 
creation of new jobs to prevent the unemployment rate from spiking again. Most 
importantly, this act extended more aid to lower income families that were obviously not 
trying to free-ride the system and were struggling to move up in the economy.103 This 
wage subsidy allowed those families to take lower-wage jobs and still have enough 
income to properly take care of children and other relatives. This subsidy not only took 
care of the families in the bottom income bracket but it also provided workers for the 
low-wage job sector. Both specificities were key in supporting the lower class and 
encouraging self-starters to join the market more frequently. 
The Hartz IV Act, on the other hand, was more interested in discouraging free-
riders and requiring participation within the local job centers. These local governmental 
employment agencies helped with the entire process of finding a job from job searching 
and applications, funding for self-employment endeavors, and funding for training. 
Similar to previous schemes, the government once again recognized the need for specific 
aid programs for those with more barriers to entry into the labor market. This 
individualistic approach allowed the government to provide all levels of help from 
disability services to childcare or debt counseling. People with drug problems or who 
needed psychological help were not turned away.104 While the local agencies were on the 
ground doing the hard work with each individual, the government’s oversight policies 
that kept the hands of the agency workers untied were instrumental. Each agency worker 
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could take advantage of the many different subsets of the unemployment program when 
helping a person find a job.  
The Hartz Acts held the right-wing populist groups down through these many 
subsets of aid. With the drop in the unemployment rate it would have been easy for the 
government to celebrate and refuse to further the aid programs already in place. These 
programs would carry the economy through Angela Merkel’s first term ending in 2009. 
Unfortunately, in 2008 the stock market crashed and the world went into recession. 
The beginning of the decline into right-wing populism began with the economic 
crisis in 2008 and the inability of the Merkel administration to quell the anxieties of the 
people. The social welfare programs put in place from 1995 to 2005 including Agenda 
2010 are a key reason for the continuation of prosperity of the German people during the 
economic crisis. As explained in the previous chapter about economic trends, Agenda 
2010 created considerable wage increases and high export rates. Much of Europe was 
quick to blame these programs as possible reasons for the economic crisis and thus the 
German government funded much of the rescue package. This decision did not allow the 
people to finally reap the benefits of their suffering and since their economic climate was 
not as unstable as other countries’, the government began focusing outward. Very few 
programs were altered or added during this period of time, and the public unrest started to 
bubble.105 
By 2013, the AfD is an established party and had begun to gain quick support 
from people who originally backed mainstream parties. The German people wanted more 
domestic focus specifically since they were now paying for other economies to recover 
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after just suffering through their own restructuring. Unfortunately for the Merkel 
administration, the migration crisis as mentioned in the immigration chapter was 
mounting slowly and peaked in 2015 and 2016. Between the outward focus of the 
government during the economic crisis from 2008 to 2010 followed closely by the 
migration crisis in 2015, the German public had had enough. By 2015, the AfD was not 
only growing rapidly but also extremely close to gaining seats in the Bundestag. In 2017 
they were finally successful in being the first right-wing populist party to gain seats in the 
Bundestag since the mid-1980s and held the highest number of seats in right-wing 
populist history in Germany.  
Some scholars argue that the AfD is not concerned at all about social welfare 
programs. The party does not often talk about the need for social welfare and instead 
mainly focuses on immigration.106 While their specific rhetoric of quelling public unrest 
through governmental policy might suggest that cutting back on these social welfare 
programs is not beneficial for the country, their main platform also feeds off the 
insecurities of the masses. Without this unrest, right-wing parties collapse at a rapid pace 
and it is the lack of recognition of the government to adjust the social welfare programs 
during the migration crisis that accelerated support for the AfD. Similar to the Schröder 
government, the AfD likes the idea of people leaning on their communities instead of on 
the government. When people are confronted with unavoidable events, they often lash 
out.107 Entire communities were banding together against the migration crisis and the fear 
that the government was more concerned about these newcomers than them.  
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Connecting back to the idea of not allowing free-riders, the AfD is extremely 
critical of anyone benefiting from the system without adding to it. With xenophobic 
sentiments floating around as more immigrants entered the country, it became very easy 
to paint any refugee or immigrant as a free-rider. This correlates with the AfD’s stance on 
scaling back social welfare programs because they want to make the rules stricter so it 
becomes even harder for anyone to take advantage of them. The AfD illustrates these 
newcomers as benefiting from decades of hard workers and government reform, and 
asserts that those in the working population should take pride in the hard work of the 
country as a whole. Often people are unlikely to be accommodating to newcomers when 
they are seen as lazy, free-riders who do not want to contribute to the German way of life 
and yet are still covered by social welfare programs. The refugees and immigrants were 
the targets of these assertions.108  
Social welfare programs, while often are forgotten under economic trends and 
immigration reform, are a key element to the rise of right-wing populism. As I have 
shown throughout the chapter, social welfare programs can be a great tool for the 
government to use in quelling right-wing populist sentiments regardless of economic 
trends. Without the fervent actions of the government from the beginning of reunification 
in terms of social welfare programs and caring for those who were likely to slip through 
the cracks, right-wing populism would have risen much earlier than 2013. The 
government’s constant attention to those in the lower income brackets through active 
labor market programs, subsidies for self-employment, and specific funding for working 
families prevented right-wing populism from joining history more consistently in 
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Germany. Only when the government began focusing on other segments of the country 
during the migration crisis do we see the sudden spike in right-wing populism. 
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Chapter 5 – The AfD 
Now I will focus on the establishment, rise, and adaptation of the AfD in German 
politics. As I have discussed throughout the last few chapters, right-wing populism feeds 
off several factors. When the various factors align, groups like the AfD are compelled to 
take advantage of the opportunity. I assert that right-wing populism is not simply 
dependent on immigration and globalization like many scholars tend to illustrate. Right-
wing populism is a continuously adapting movement that fundamentally thrives on public 
unrest and dissatisfaction with the government. The AfD has learned and altered its 
strategies from previous movements but overall is the same as all right-wing populist 
groups. In this chapter I will bring together all the rhetoric about the AfD thus far in the 
paper as well as provide deeper information about the AfD that sets it up for continued 
success. 
 Thus far we know that the AfD was established in 2013 and provided an outlet for 
public discontent with economic policy and globalization. The three founders of the AfD 
were Bernd Lucke, Konrad Adam, and Alexander Gauland. The party was characterized 
as a diverse group of scholars, economists, and mainstream party politicians that catered 
to the disappointment of middle class voters. Ideal policy outcomes of each of the three 
founders differed greatly from more moderate, passive listening to aggressive, extremism 
which allowed the party to create a wider constituent base. Beyond better economic 
policy that specifically focused on Germans, they also condemned the open borders of the 
EU and the lingering presence of Allied forces in Germany. The xenophobia of Islam, 
 
65 | Green 
 
rejection of extensive immigration projects, and widespread fear of multiculturalism set 
the party up perfectly for the coming years.109 
The party gained 12.6 percent of the vote in the 2017 election for the Bundestag 
and became the third largest party in national politics. It is the main opposition to the 
Grand Coalition government that consists of the Social Democratic Party and the 
Christian Democratic Union under Chancellor Angela Merkel.110 Similar to all previous 
right-wing populist parties, their main concern is the protection of German culture and 
norms. In terms of immigration, the migration crisis created a quick avenue for the party 
to insert itself into the political playing field. While economic trends like unemployment 
were decreasing, Germany was slated to bail out several countries during the 2008 
economic crisis and taxpayers were not happy. Finally, social welfare programs had not 
been substantially adjusted since Angela Merkel took power in 2005, leaving many 
German people scared for their futures as migration was the main headline across the 
world. These three sectors of German life created the perfect storm for AfD support and 
rapid induction into the national government.  
On a fundamental level, the AfD’s structure is significantly more stable and better 
defined than that of the Republikaner. After reunification, the Republikaner struggled to 
define its level of extremism which drove a wedge between those on the more extreme 
side of the spectrum and those looking to form a more developed political group that 
encouraged deeper policy than xenophobic acts. The core issues that the AfD chooses to 
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focus on are those that specifically target vulnerable groups and the leaders preach more 
substantive policy than simply promoting violent acts against immigrants and guest 
workers like the Republikaner was known for. While the AfD is not impervious to 
possible internal splintering, the leadership has been more strategic with its wide 
constituent base than the leaders of the Republikaner were. Many of the local and 
national leaders are “former CDU politicians and national-conservative intellectuals” 
which provides people with realistic idols for them to follow as they decide to descent 
from mainstream parties.111 With leaders from differing political backgrounds and an 
emphasis on the people, the AfD continues to hold substantial power unlike the 
Republikaner even as the economic and social climates are settling down. 
Additionally, from the beginning of its existence, the AfD has fought the notion 
that it is a right extremist party. If the party had established itself as extremist, the 
government would not have taken it seriously and their moderate constituents would not 
have supported it. The important distinction the AfD has to continuously assert is that 
while some supporters identify as right extremists, the AfD, like former right-wing 
populist parties, is anti-establishment but still supports democracy. Right extremist 
groups, on the other hand, condemn both. With only about two to three percent of the 
population identifying as right extremist, it became pertinent that the AfD be very 
strategic with its marketing from the beginning.112 One of the AfD’s largest struggles is 
walking that thin line between extremism and populism. As I will explain throughout this 
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chapter, this continues to be a struggle for the party, but the leaders have gotten better 
about appeasing both sides simultaneously as shown by the increasing support. 
With the height of the migration crisis wreaking havoc across Europe, many AfD 
supporters were not pleased with the open-arm approach of Chancellor Merkel. East 
Germans in particular felt left behind. As explained previously, many East Germans were 
still experiencing high unemployment rates and restrictive social welfare programs, yet 
immigrants were given aid simply upon arrival. A common sentiment began to echo 
throughout the country that Chancellor Merkel was more interested in helping 
international people before her own. This slander fueled the hatred toward the current 
government as well as toward refugees. Migrants were targeted for their skin color 
specifically in East Germany because East Germans became tired of feeling like they 
were constantly being looked down upon by West Germany and the government.113 The 
inability of the government to recognize these sentiments is exactly why East and West 
Germans alike are so unhappy. 
Prior to the migration crisis in 2015, the AfD held only about five percent of the 
vote.114 At the founding in 2013, the main platform that the AfD used to establish itself 
was the economic crisis. This entailed specific claims against the euro, capitalism, and 
the western market structure that was extremely globalized.115 Additionally, the party 
opposed the bailouts of member states within the Eurozone and the understanding that 
 
113 Thomas Klikauer, “German Neo-Nazis and a New Party,” Jewish Political Studies Review30, 
no. 1/2 (2019): pp. 243-252, p.245. 
114 Alexander Häusler, “Forms of Right-Wing Populism: The Example Alternative for Germany 
(AfD),” inStifled Progress – International Perspectives on Social Work and Social Policy in the Era 
of Right-Wing Populism, ed. Kerry Dunn and Jörg Fischer (Opladen; Berlin; Toronto: Verlag 
Barbara Budrich, 2019), pp. 17-31, p.21. 
115 Klikauer, 251.  
 
68 | Green 
 
German prosperity needed to be put on hold to help other countries.116 This platform 
focused mainly on the economic burden Germany carried as being part of the Eurozone 
but also hinted at the globalization factor in having all economies within the Eurozone 
linked. While Germany was pulling itself out of reunification and unemployment was 
high, there was very little support from other countries throughout the Eurozone since it 
was only created in 1999 and many of the active market programs in Germany were well 
underway at that point. Now, the AfD saw a large issue with having to bail out countries 
that did not deal with much of the same rebuilding they did on their own. 
With the media attention the AfD was able to garner, Bernd Lucke, who was the 
elected Member of Parliament for the AfD in 2015, took advantage of the economic 
issues that the Merkel administration consistently overlooked. In a successful effort to 
connect with the people, Lucke explained his dissatisfaction with the euro and allowed 
the conversation to be voiced nationally. The rise in prices from the adoption of the euro 
was bad enough without the fact that East Germany was still adjusting to the deutsche 
Mark. By this point, East Germany became tired of being forced to adapt to western ways 
without feeling represented within the government.117 People across Germany felt the 
inability of the government to produce stability and it only got worse in 2015. The AfD 
capitalized. 
Adaptability became a crucial element of the AfD’s strategy. Essentially, the AfD 
became the party that listened to any possible qualm someone could have about the 
current establishment. At the beginning of 2015, the AfD still focused mainly on the 
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Eurozone as a key enemy of Germans. Within a few months this platform almost 
completely shifted to center on the migration crisis itself as that gained more attention 
throughout the world. By the end of the migration crisis, the AfD now contained a wide-
spread group of supporters with complaints about economic, social, and globalization 
policies. In 2015, “the chairman of the AfD of Brandenburg Alexander Gauland 
described the refugee crisis as a ‘gift’ for his party” because of the rapid uneasiness it 
created throughout the country. The crisis allowed the party to attract those from both 
anti-immigration and German-nationalist sentiment groups, once again broadening its 
constituent base.118 
 Even though the AfD has gone through its fair share of changes in leadership, it 
has persisted and thrived. With the new leaders and changing policy climate, the party 
has moved to being a more “racist, nationalistic, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic party” due 
to its need to assert its dominance in the conversation about immigration. Björn Höcke, a 
prominent party leader today, provides the more right-wing rhetoric throughout the party, 
continuing to keep the small right extremist percentage of the population as supporters.119 
A dissenter of the party, Franziska Schreiber, explains party leaders’ logic in keeping 
Höcke as a prominent, vocal member while still portraying more moderate sentiments for 
those uncomfortable with that rhetoric as a tactic to cater to as many people as possible. 
Due to the anti-Nazi and anti-hate-speech laws, the party works hard to stay on the 
politically correct side of the debate or incur large fees and lose credibility within the 
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state.120 One of the worst moves the party could make would be to fully embrace the right 
extreme view of Höcke. 
 Between the constant changes to the main platform of the AfD and the wide-array 
of leaders that have successfully led the party, the AfD has very little in its nature that 
stays consistent over long periods of time. Scholars have identified this lack of 
consistency and thus assert that the entire party platform is a facade. The party produces 
little to no tangible programs or policies in terms of solving the issues its constituents 
have with the current state of the country. Unlike other parties, the AfD tries to avoid 
unsavory names such as neo-Nazi by never actually attempting to implement new policy. 
Instead, the party simply listens to the people and fights the current policies that are in 
place that are causing the public unrest. The party takes arguments from differing 
political attitudes and pieces them together to create a pseudo-cohesive platform that 
caters to the people.121 This strategy allows the party to continue to garner support from 
people with different ideologies similar to its somewhat polarizing leadership.  
 As alluded to in the aforementioned paragraph, the AfD has allowed for right 
extreme ideas since the beginning of its existence. The regional leaders seem to fall 
further to the right than Bernd Lucke. With Lucke being more economically liberal than 
his fellow members, party splintering was looming. The differing opinions of the caucus 
members for certain districts versus Members of Parliament is part of the reason for the 
widespread support yet can become an issue in terms of consistent policy. As the regional 
leaders begin to exert their policy goals as more conservative or right extreme, Lucke has 
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been put in a sticky spot to either accommodate their ideas or assert authoritarian control 
within the party.122 
 Splintering has also begun among the regional leaders as well. The underlying 
themes of the policies are the same but the policy implications differ from one region to 
the next. For example, Gauland, the AfD caucus chair in Brandenburg, shares the same 
ideals of ethnic closure and the importance of protecting ethnic Germans as Höcke, 
caucus chair in Thuringia. But, Gauland interpreted this to include ethnic Russian-
Germans who have begun to reintegrate into society after the Cold War, but Höcke does 
not agree. This miscommunication led to advocacy for a partial opening of borders in 
Berlin to Russian-Germans and LGBTQIA members and a dismissal of these same 
groups in Höcke’s region. These fundamental issues cause an inconsistency across the 
country that does not favor the AfD. Scholars have identified this breakdown of the party 
as opportunistic to the issues in front of them but definitely not cohesive.123 With 
incomplete policies like these at the regional level it is no surprise Lucke was inclined to 
authoritatively decide the outcome of the party. Unfortunately for him, he was not 
reelected as a Member of Parliament in 2019, signaling a possible diversion toward right 
extremism for the party.  
 Luckily, the AfD is not the only right-wing populist party in Europe that has 
broken into the political playing field and is trying to continue its success. As shown by 
other groups in Europe, right-wing populist groups that fall close to extremism are very 
careful to keep their rhetoric from representing fascism or Nazism. In defiance, the AfD 
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has begun using Nazi expressions more frequently. They are attempting to conjure up 
more ethno-nationalist sentiments by striking a deeper chord within the German 
population.124 While in previous years it has been more careful with its language and 
defiance of the establishment, the leaders have become more comfortable in their 
constituent base and are once again looking to shake up the conversation. Unfortunately, 
if they are to be taken seriously in the long run, it is unlikely that this strategy will be the 
one that carries the party forward. While scholars recognize this possible self-destructing 
plan, only time will tell whether it is as detrimental as predicted.  
 Throughout this chapter I have shown that the AfD has garnered a large following 
and should not be taken lightly. While it has shifted significantly over the few years that 
it has been prominent, its quick rise to fame has not resulted in a quick descent. It holds a 
significant constituent base and continues to gain supporters. As it begins to consolidate 
its leadership platform, it will form a more reliable, more attractive party. Its right 
extremist sentiments are something to be careful of but as long as they are kept at lower 
levels, these ideas are not likely to take the party down anytime soon. If the party 
continues to follow its current steady trajectory, it will fall under the “same category as 
successful right-wing populist parties such as the Front National in France or the United 
Kingdom Independence Party.”125 Even with its Nazi level language, the strategic play on 
nostalgia for a time when Germany was at the top of the world is likely to carry it into the 
foreseeable future.  
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 Due to the reactive nature of the AfD, the fate of the party is hardly up to the 
leaders themselves. How the Grand Coalition government as well as other popular 
mainstream parties handle the conversation on immigration, European globalization, and 
economic consequences for Germany is everything for the AfD. If the current 
government continues to shy away from the hard topics and neglect to put out tangible 
legislation that takes the public’s complaints into account, the AfD will continue to gain 
supporters and rise within the Bundestag. Open border policies and other liberal 
initiatives on the integration of Germany into the EU directly combat the German 
nationalistic approach of the AfD.126 The party leaders are experts at skewing the images 
of the other parties and until the other parties take seriously the real concerns that are 
exacerbated by the AfD, voters will continue to flock toward right-wing populism and the 
AfD will continue to unapologetically shake up the existing establishment. 
 It is almost impossible to predict where the AfD is headed in the near future due 
to the many factors that it depends on to exist. Between immigration and globalization 
policy, economic trends, and social welfare and active labor market initiatives, the AfD 
has capitalized on public unrest and will continue to keep leaders from other mainstream 
parties on the edge of their seats. Even though these sectors have begun to calm down 
across the EU, the AfD still persists. I argue that the AfD is not going to crumble anytime 
soon and that leaders of other parties should start to pick the portions of its platform that 
are tolerable and work on partnerships. The pure recognition of the complaints of the 
people could be the difference in a short versus long future for the AfD and right-wing 
populism in Germany as a whole. 
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Conclusion 
As indicated at the end of the last chapter and implicitly throughout the paper, the 
phenomenon of the rise in right-wing populism is worth paying attention to because it is 
unlikely the AfD will disappear in the near future and it now holds enough power to 
contribute to legislation and policy in the government. Much of Europe is experiencing 
similar uprisings that directly challenge the establishment and are gaining support 
quickly. While the AfD might be the most recent right-wing populist party in Germany, it 
is not the first and not likely to be the last. The versatility of the leadership within the 
AfD and the adaptability of right-wing populist groups in general will be extremely 
helpful in the long term for these parties.  
Throughout this paper, I outline the full history of right-wing populist groups in 
Germany from the end of World War II when Germany finally began to gain footing 
again and advocate for itself. One of the key characteristics of right-wing populism is its 
ability to make the public’s concerns into a movement. I find that there are three 
prominent sectors of German life that affect support for right-wing populism. 
Immigration and globalization are agreed upon by almost all scholars because with 
constant change comes more uneasiness, especially for those in the lower classes. 
Economic trends are seen in parallel with immigration rates as right-wing populist groups 
frame an increase in unemployment as a direct cause of migrants taking German jobs. 
Finally, social welfare programs and active labor market initiatives are really the glue 
between economic trends and immigration policy because without strong programs 
protecting the lower classes, unrest grows and right-wing populist groups flourish. 
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With this analysis, I assessed the AfD and extrapolated to explain its induction 
into the Bundestag and possible future in German rhetoric. The most important point is 
that for groups like the AfD with constantly changing platforms and leadership styles, the 
future is even more variable than other mainstream parties. The Republikaner was a 
strong party that also grew overnight on the back of public unrest. Unfortunately, the 
government’s dedication to social welfare programs was successful in driving much of 
the uneasiness down at the time and allowed the sitting government to see its policies 
lower unemployment and create integration programs for immigrants. In the 
Republikaner’s case, while economic unrest was still high, social welfare programs were 
targeted at those most affected and immigration rates began to slow, thus decreasing the 
overall stress on the people. 
Today, the status of the three sectors is once again in disarray for the AfD to 
capitalize on. For example, migration rates across the world from poorer countries has 
increased significantly in recent years. As global warming starts to make the countries at 
the equator more inhabitable, resources will become scarce and people will resort to war 
to solve their problems. Conflict zones drive people to seek refuge in more democratic 
states and until the European Union figures out a better way to deal with the hundreds of 
thousands of migrants, right-wing populism is going to spread across Europe in 
particular. Countries will begin to tighten their borders, thus putting a larger strain on 
those that choose to keep their borders open like Angela Merkel did during the peak of 
the migration crisis in 2015 and 2016. Further research can be done to dig into the deeper 
meanings behind migration patterns and how that is going to affect democratic, open-
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border states in comparison to right-wing populism not only in Germany but across the 
world. 
In this moment, we are presented with a similar climate to when the Republikaner 
gained support, but the AfD has managed to go far beyond what the Republikaner ever 
accomplished. From the literature we see that the AfD has built up a solid constituent 
base and will continue to feed off of any missteps that the mainstream parties take, but I 
find it unlikely that the government will ever be run by the AfD as the top party. The 
party is still establishing itself and many people throughout Germany are waiting to see 
what they do next, but the reactive nature of the party will set it back from ever holding 
the position of Chancellor. In addition, we find in both the Republikaner and the AfD that 
the leadership thrives on chaos but that is not sustainable. People like the idea of more 
radical groups that are looking to challenge the establishment when they feel the 
establishment is not providing enough for them. In the event that the AfD becomes the 
most powerful party in the Bundestag, not only will Germany become much more 
isolationist and possibly sever long-existing ties with other key countries, the party will 
also have to produce tangible legislation that helps the country through another massive 
change as they pull away from globalization. Only time will tell how the world will react 
to the growing crisis of right-wing populism, but the longer world leaders wait, the more 
time right-wing populist groups have to stir up uneasiness among the masses and grow 
their reputations beyond whispers. 
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